Judy Lyman, Norman, Rohrbach, Lyland

She married, waited for death, took the money and ran

Veneta, Oregon

This woman is so sick that she married a man dying of cancer. She took over his home and separated him from his family. The worst part is she has even managed to take the grieving process away from his family. This woman came in and broke everyone to pieces. There is no way to fight her so we are plastering her name all over the internet to try to spare the rest of the world. She has done so much damage in so little time. Judy's sole purpose in life is finding people, tearing their family apart, and running away with anything of value. Learn from our mistakes and don't let this woman in your life.

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She married, waited for death, took the money and ran

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IndianasLatestMoocher

Submitted: 11/13/2012

Judy loves to play victim. This one or that one is "stalking" or "abusing" or "harassing her." Fact is no one gives a shit about this lowlife. She's no one and nothing. Look at that ugly puss. Crawl back under the bridge where you belong Judy.

Don't believe a word she says. If she tells you someone is a con or stalker - you can bet Judy's jealous of them because they are a good person who helps others and Judy is just the opposite.

IndianasLatestMoocher

Submitted: 11/13/2012

Anyone who associates with or believes this bitch better read. Even the state of Oregon knew she was LYING!:

Oregon v. Lyman
5/29/1991

4, 808 P2d 1002 (1991). The state argues that the evidence was admissible under OEC 804(3)(c), which allows admission of a

"statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."

The rule also requires that the declarant be unavailable, but defendant does not dispute that that condition was met when Judy asserted the marital privilege.

This is the first case to address the exception for statements against pecuniary interest as it is formulated in OEC 804(3)(c). The Legislative Commentary to the rule explains that that kind of statement is reliable because people do not say things that are damaging to their interests, unless they believe that they are true. OEC 804(3)(c) incorporates the rationale into the rule by requiring the statement to be "so far contrary to the declarant's * * * interest * * * that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true." Compare Persad v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, Inc., 106 Or App 615, 809 P2d 706 (1991).

The trial court implicitly found that defendant's and Judy's finances were interrelated. It found that Judy appreciated the risk that her statements exposed defendant to penal sanctions and reasoned that people know that there may be serious consequences of a conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants. The question, however, is not merely whether she appreciated the risk, but whether a reasonable person in her position would consider the risk so great that she would not tell a lie. We conclude that, under the circumstances, the risk of pecuniary loss to Judy was too attenuated to ensure that the statements were reliable.

A reasonable person's veracity is more likely to be affected by considerations of the primary effect of statements than by considerations of indirect effects. The primary effect here was to expose defendant to penal sanctions. Judy made the statements after having a fight with her husband that was of sufficient magnitude for the police to be called. She was angry at him for failing to pay the rent and upset, because she thought he intended to drive when he was intoxicated. Pecuniary loss to defendant from the penal sanctions was only a secondary effect, and pecuniary loss to Judy because of her husband's loss was even further removed. The statements were not so far contrary to her pecuniary interests that a reasonable person in her position would not have said them if she believed that they were untrue.

The state does not argue that the evidence is admissible under any other exception.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Disposition

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

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